We Need Inquire Further: Normative Sterotypes, Hasidic Jews, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 by Kaplowitz, William
Michigan Journal of Race and Law 
Volume 12
2007 
We Need Inquire Further: Normative Sterotypes, Hasidic Jews, 
and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
William Kaplowitz 
University of Michgan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjrl 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Law and Race Commons, Legal History 
Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Religion Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
William Kaplowitz, We Need Inquire Further: Normative Sterotypes, Hasidic Jews, and the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 537 (2007). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjrl/vol12/iss2/7 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of Race and Law by an authorized 
editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
WE NEED INQUIRE FURTHER: NORMATIVE
STEREOTYPES, HASIDIC JEWS, AND THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866
William Kaplowitz*
I. INTRODUCTION-WE NEED INQUIRE FURTHER:
NORMATIVE STEREOTYPES, HASIDIC JEWS, AND
THE CIVIL R IGHTS ACT OF 1866 ............................................ 538
II. JEWS ARE PROTECTED FROM RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF i866, BUT APPARENTLY
NOT FROM RELIGIOUS ANTI-SEMITISM ................................... 542
A. The Civil Rights Act Protects People ofAll Ethnicities,
but only from Racial Discrimination .............................. 543
B. Shaare Tefila Congregation and Saint Francis
College Extended Protection under the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 to Jews and A rabs .......................................... 544
C. The Civil Rights Act Prohibits Only
Discrimination Based on Genetic Membership
in an E thnic G roup .................................................. 547
D. Jews Are Complicated:Jews Are Both an Ethnicity
and a Religion and Have Faced Religious and
R acial A nti-Sem itism ................................................ 548
E. The Civil Rights Act Purports to Reach Only Racial
A nti-Sem itism ........................................................ 550
III. LEBLANC-STERNBERG AND SINGER HELD THAT ORTHODOX
JEWS WERE PROTECTED BY THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION BASED ON JEWISH
R ELIGIOUS PRACTICE ............................................................ 551
A. In LeBlanc-Sternberg the Court Held that Racial
and Religious Discrimination Are Hard to Distinguish,
and There Is no N eed to Try ........................................ 551
B. In Singer the Court Held That the Nature of the
Alleged Discrimination Is Irrelevant ............................... 554
IV THESE CASES Do NOT MAKE SENSE UNDER TRADITIONAL
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866 DOCTRINE, NOR Do THEY FIT
W ITH O THER R ECENT CASES ................................................ 556
A. A Plain Reading of the 1987 Cases Does not
Suggest the Results in the Hasidic Cases ......................... 557
* B.A. magna cum laude, Columbia University, J.D. and M.U.P. University of
Michigan, expected 2008. I would like to thank Davina Harris and Jason Clark for all their
hard work as editors, Professor Anna Kirkland, in whose excellent seminar the ideas in this
Note came together, and most of all my wife, Rachel, for all her love and support.
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
B. Other Recent Cases Continue to Rule Religious
Discrimination Beyond the Scope of The Civil
R ights A ct ............................................................. 558
V PERHAPS RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION AGAINST HASIDIC JEWS
Is DISCRIMINATION 'ON THE BASIS OF RACE,' ALTHOUGH
MOTIVATED NOT BY RACIAL ANIMUS, BUT BY
NORMATIVE RACIAL STEREOTYPES ......................................... 560
A. 'Racial Discrimination' Might Include
N orm ative Stereotypes ............................................... 560
B. These Cases May Involve Normative Racial
Stereotypes and Therefore Racial Discrimination ................ 562
1. Assimilation Is not Just a General Social
Norm, But Has Exerted Particularly
Powerful Pressure on Jews .................................. 562
2. Normative Discrimination, Unlike Racial
Animus, Is Particularly Likely to Occur
Among Members of the Same Group ................. 564
V I. C O N C LU SIO N ................................................................. 565
I. INTRODUCTION-WE NEED INQUIRE FURTHER: NORMATIVE
STEREOTYPES, HASIDIC JEWS,
AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866
In the late 1980s, a Hasidic Rabbi named Yitzchok LeBlanc-
Sternberg applied for a permit to establish a home-synagogue in a hous-
ing development in Ramapo, New York.' His neighbors attempted to
deny the permit, allegedly because they were prejudiced against Hasidic
Jews and did not wish to see an increase in the Hasidic population of the
area.2 In 1994, a Hasidic Denver public school teacher named Yishai
Singer, a Hispanic convert to Judaism, alleged that he was discriminated
against because of his Hasidic religious practice, beliefs, and garb.
3
LeBlanc-Sternberg and Singer each filed causes of action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981-1982, the sections of the United States code that incorporate the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.4 Congress passed this act immediately after the
1. LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 781 E Supp. 261,264 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
2. Id. at 264; William Glaberson, Orthodox Jews Battle Neighbors in a Zoning War,
N.YTIMEs,June 3,1991, at Al ("The motivation of some people is that they do not want
the Ultra-Orthodox or the Hasidim to move in.").
3. Singer v. Denver Sch. Dist. No. 1,959 F Supp. 1325,1327-28 (D. Colo. 1997).
4. Runyon v. McCrary 427 U.S. 160, 169 n. 8, (1976) (stating that a "portion" of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 is presently codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1981);Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422 (1968) ("In its original form, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 was part of
§ 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866."); Saint Francis Coil. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604,612
(1987) (stating that § 1981 has its roots in both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Voting
Rights Act of 1870); see also PETER W Low AND JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS, 5TH ED. (Foundation Press 2004), 1082 (stating that
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Civil War to protect recently freed Blacks from private discrimination.
5
The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted these statutes to apply
only to racial discrimination.
According to modern Supreme Court opinions, The Civil Rights
Act of 1866 prohibits only "discrimination [against members of protected
groups] solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics." The
Court refers to this type of discrimination as 'racial animus.'8 In the 1987
case Shaare Tefila Congregation v. CobbJews were recognized as a protected
ethnic group under these statutes, 9 but the Supreme Court also reaffirmed
that The Civil Rights Act only prohibits 'ethnic' or 'ancestral' discrimina-
tion.' ° The Act does not encompass religious discrimination." Yet, despite
the Supreme Court's rulings, the district courts held that both Rabbi
LeBlanc-Sternberg's and Mr. Singers' allegations of discrimination based
on specific Jewish religious practice were actionable under The Act.' 2 This
Note will document and explain this paradox.
Part II of this Note will review the development of the Court's ju-
risprudence surrounding The Civil Rights Act, and will discuss the two
important restrictions on the scope of the Act: (1) it applies only to cases
of racial discrimination, and (2) it applies only when the plaintiff and de-
fendant are persons of different races.13 This section will also explain how
Jews became a protected group under The Civil Rights Act, which, after
all, was passed to protect Southern freed Blacks from the predations of
"[plortions of [Section 1 of The Civil Rights Act of 1866] survive as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981
and 1982,").This Note will refer to Sections 1981 and 1982 together as The Civil Rights
Act of 1866 (The Civil Rights Act or The Act).
5. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273,289 (1976).
6. Id. at 285; see also Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791, 1789 (1966) ("Congress
intended to protect a limited category of rights, specifically defined in terms of racial
equality"); Saint Francis Coll. v. A1-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) (noting that dis-
crinination based on religion does not lead to a § 1981 claim); Shaare Tefila Congregation
v. Cobb 481 U.S. 615-17 (1987) (ignoring the obvious potential religious discrimination
claims of plaintiff synagogue).
7. Saint. Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 613; Shaare Tefila Congregation, 481 U.S. at 617.
8. Shaare Tefila Congregation, 481 U.S. at 617. As the Court has defined race under
The Civil Rights Act as equivalent to ethnicity and ancestry, this Note will use the terms
interchangeably.
9. Id.
10. See also Shaare Tefila Congregation, 481 U.S. at 617; Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at
613.
11. Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 613 (noting that discrimination based on religion
does not lead to a 5 1981 claim); see also Shaare Tefila Congregation, 481 U.S. 615 (ignor-
ing the obvious potential religious discrimination claims of plaintiffi).
12. LeBlanc-Sternberg, 781 F Supp. at 267-68; Singer, 959 E Supp. at 1327.The district
court judge allowed LeBlanc-Sternberg's § 1982 claim, but a jury then found no liability
on the part of the defendants. United States. v.Vill. of Airmont, 839 F Supp. 1054, 1063
(1993).
13. See Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 609-10.
SPRING 2007]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
White Redeemers. 4 Lastly, this section will consider the unique com-
plexities that emerge when applying these statutes, with their restrictions,
to allegations of anti-Semitism. These complexities emerge because 'Jew'
is both an ethnic and a religious identity," and Jews have historically been
plagued by two distinct brands of anti-Semitism: religious anti-Semitism
and ethnic or racial anti-Semitism.
1 6
Part I will conclude by demonstrating that, according to the Su-
preme Court, The Civil Rights Act of 1866 should apply equally to Jews
as to other ethnic groups. That is, even though Jews might experience
both racial and religious discrimination, each directed towards the same
Jewish identity, The Act can only protect Jews from racial (or ethnic) dis-
crimination-not religious discrimination.
Part III will take a closer look at the facts and legal analysis in the
LeBlanc-Sternberg and Singer cases. In each case, the defendants argued that
the discrimination in question was of a religious nature and thus not ac-
tionable under The Act. In each case the court rejected the defendants'
claims. In LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, the court acknowledged that racial
and religious discrimination are different concepts.17 The court then
claimed that religious and racial discrimination against Jews are difficult to
distinguish, and declined to make any effort to determine the true nature
of the discrimination alleged. ' Instead, the court asserted that since "Jews
are entitled to the protections of 55 1981 and 1982 ... [w]e need not in-
quire any further."1 9 The Singer v. Denver School District No. 1 court did
attempt to discern religious from racial discrimination, but held that this
distinction was irrelevant to Jewish claims of discrimination under The
Act. Specifically, the court reasoned that "[s]ince Singer is claiming he was
discriminated against as a Jew, a distinct racial group for the purposes of
5 1981, Defendants are not entitled to judgment on the basis that he is
claiming religious discrimination. 2 0 Together, these cases might suggest
that any member of a protected ethnic group can sue under The Civil
Rights Act for discrimination based on that identity, whether or not there
14. McDonald, 427 U.S. at 289.
15. See United Jewish Communities, National Jewish Population Survey, 2, available at
http://www.ujc.org/local includes/downloads/temp/njps2000-Olrevised_1.06.04.pdf
(last visited March 18, 2007). The question of Jewish self-definition is rich and complex.
See Zvi Gitelman, What Is a Jew? Conceptions and Their Consequences in Russia and
Ukraine,(2006) (unpublished essay, on file with author) (reviewing definitions from the
United States and Europe, including a "nation," a "people," a "race," an "ethnic group," a
"religion," a "religious race," and "a cultural group with peculiar racial traits.").
16. Nico Stehr & Jay Weinstein, The Power of Knowledge: Race Science, Race Policy, and
the Holocaust, 13 Soc. EPISTEMOLOGY 1,4-5 (1999).
17. 781 E Supp. at 267.
18. Id. at 267-68.
19. Id. at 268 (internal citations omitted).
20. Singer, 959 E Supp. at 1331.
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is a clear racial animus.2 1 Alternatively, Jews might uniquely be able to
bring religious discrimination claims under The Act, because of the prac-
tical difficulty of distinguishing between racial and religious anti-
Semitism.2
Part IV will consider, but ultimately reject, the possibility that either
of these explanations are correct. This section will carefully review the
Court's holding in Shaare Tefila Congregation and conclude that it runs
counter to both district courts' rulings. Next, this part will engage in a
close reading of two subsequent cases. 23 This will show first that LeBlanc-
Sternberg and Singer's expansion of The Civil Rights Act of 1866 to in-
clude even non-racial discrimination, such as religious discrimination,
against a protected ethnic group is not representative of a broad reinter-
pretation of The Act; rather, it is unique to Jews.24 Perhaps more
surprisingly, this review will show that only Hasidic Jews have been able to
successfully bring claims for religious discrimination under The Act; non-
Orthodox Jews have not been able to do so. 25 This will suggest that it is not
just the double identity 'Jew,' but rather some unique feature of Orthodox,
specifically Hasidic,26 Jews that is determinative in LeBlanc-Sternberg and
Singer.
Part V will introduce the concept of normative stereotypes. These
stereotypes are not based on factual (either accurate or inaccurate) beliefs
about a group, but rather on normative beliefs about how that group
21. For example, an Iraqi immigrant who was discriminated against because of his
national origin, and not because of his Arab ethnicity, might nonetheless have a cause of
action under % 1981-1982. Cf Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 613 (stating that such dis-
crimination would not be actionable); but see Gold v. Gallaudet Coll., No. 86-7079, 1987
U.S. App. LEXIS 17616, at *12 (unpublished) (D.C. Cir. Nov. 20, 1987) (suggesting that
such discrimination would be actionable.)
22. Cf LeBlanc-Sternberg, 781 F Supp. at 267 ("Because Jewish culture, ancestry, and
ethnic identity are intricately bound up with Judaic religious beliefs, racial and religious
discrimination against Jews cannot be as easily distinguished as defendants would have
it.").
23. Elkhatib v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., No. 02 C 8131, 2004 WL 2600119 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 15, 2004); Kratz v. Coll. of Staten Island, No. 96-CV-0680, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5199 (E.D.N.Y Mar. 15,2000).
24. See Elkhatib, 2004 WL 2600119, at *3.
25. See Kratz, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5199, at *7.
26. Courts have been imprecise in their usage of 'Hasidic' and 'Orthodox.' They are
not equivalent: Hasidim are a subset of Orthodox Jews. See LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher,
67 F3d. 412, 417 (2nd. Cir. 1995). Hasidim are distinguished by, among other things, an
emphasis on cultural separatism. See StAUEL G. FREEDMAN, JEW VS. JEW: THE STRUGGLE FOR
THE SOUL OF AMERICAN JEWRY 217-26 (Simon & Schuster 2000).This Note will use the
term 'Orthodox' when generality is appropriate, but will largely use 'Hasidic,' as the issues
discussed are most relevant to Hasidim.
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should behave.27 Normative stereotypes are distinct from general social
norms, in that these expectations apply specifically to members a certain
group, and not to every member of a society; they thus burden members
of that group solely on the basis of group membership. 28 This section sug-
gests that although the results in LeBlanc-Sternberg and Singer are incorrect
as a matter of doctrine, they are consistent with the theory that anti-
discrimination laws prohibit discrimination based on normative stereo-
types as well as discrimination based on animus.29
LeBlanc-Sternberg and Singer were discriminated against because of
their Hasidic practice. Undoubtedly this was religious discrimination,
which is still beyond the scope of The Civil Rights Act. However, it may
also have been racial discrimination, although it did not reflect racial ani-
mus. Instead, the discrimination was based upon the Hasidic plaintiffs'
failure to conform to a normative Jewish stereotype, specifically, the belief
that Jews should assimilate into broader American culture. This assimila-
tion norm may be more strongly applied to Jews than to non-Jews such as
the Amish. This suggests that assimilation is not just a general social norm,
but is instead associated with Jewish ethnic status, and so functions as a
normative ethnic stereotype. 30 The hostility faced by plaintiffs because of
their failure to assimilate was therefore not race-neutral, but was in fact
triggered by their status as ethnic Jews. It should therefore be recognized
as racial discrimination. At least in the special case of Hasidic Jews, The
Civil Rights Act of 1866 may encompass discrimination based on norma-
tive stereotypes as well as racial animus.While the expansion of civil rights
is generally laudable, such expansion should occur through forthright and
careful law-making--not the shoddy and injudicious disregard of law and
fact evinced by the courts in Leblanc-Sternberg and Singer.
II.JEws ARE PROTECTED FROM RACIAL DISCRIMINATION UNDER
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866, BUT APPARENTLY NOT
FROM RELIGIOUS ANTI-SEMITISM
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 because of "the neces-
sity for further relief of the constitutionally emancipated former Negro
27. K. Anthony Appiah, Stereotypes and the Shaping of Identity, in PREJuDIcIAl APPEAR-
ANCES: THE LoGic or AMERICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW, 55, 63-65 (Robert C. Post ed.,
Duke Univ. Press 2001).
28. See Appiah id. at 65.
29. Id. at 63; see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) ("[W]e
are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting
that they matched the stereotype associated with their group."); but see Jespersen v. Harrah's
Operating Co., 392 F3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that not all invocations of norma-
tive stereotypes will be deemed unlawfully discriminatory).
30. See Appiah, supra note 27, at 64.
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slaves." 31 Sections 1981 and 1982 protect the right to contract and to hold
property, respectively, and provide that 'all persons' or 'all citizens' in the
United States shall have the same rights as 'White citizens' with regard to
these rights.3 Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the secu-
rity of persons and property as is enjoyed by white
33citizens....
Section 1982 has similar language and provides that "[a]ll citizens of the
United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is
enjoyed by White citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property. 3 4 Importantly, The Act even applies to
35
private action.
A. The Civil Rights Act Protects People ofAll Ethnicities,
but only from Racial Discrimination
The statutory text ofThe Civil Rights Act does not state what type of
discrimination the Act prohibits, declaring only that "all persons [or citi-




However, the Supreme Court has consistently held that The Act prohibits
only racial discrimination and does not reach claims of discrimination based
on religion or national origin. 7 This understanding of The Act is based
upon its use of the term "white citizens" to describe the baseline group of
rights which all individuals shall now enjoy.3 According to the Court, these
phrases "emphasiz[e] 'the racial character of the rights being protected.' 09
White and non-White victims alike have recourse under The Civil
Rights Act when complaining of racial discrimination.40 This interpreta-
tion was not self-evident: the same language drawn upon to establish the
racial character of the rights being protected-"the same right ... as is
31. McDonald, 427 U.S. at 289.
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (2006).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2006).
35. Jones, 392 U.S. at 413.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1981-1982 (2006).
37. Jones, 392 U.S. at 413; see also Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 613 (noting that
discrimination based on religion does not lead to a Section 1981 claim).
38. See Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791 (1966).
39. McDonald, 427 U.S. at 287 (quoting Rachel, 384 U.S. at 791).
40. See id.
SPRING 2007]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
enjoyed by white citizens" 41-might also suggest that The Act protects
only non-White victims of discrimination by White perpetrators. How-
ever, other language in The Act states that "all persons [citizens] shall have
the same right. 42 This compels the opposite conclusion: The Civil Rights
Act of 1866 prohibits racial discrimination against a victim of any race."
The legislative history of The Act likewise supports this understanding. As
one Congressional sponsor stated, The Civil Rights Act was meant to ap-
ply to "every race and color."
44
Nonetheless,The Civil Rights Act of 1866 does not reach all acts of
racial discrimination: it does not cover racial discrimination inflicted upon
a victim by a member of his or her own racial group.4 Therefore, under
The Act, a person classified as White cannot sue claiming discrimination
by another person also classified as White.4 6 This created an open and cru-
cial question as to whether certain ethnic or racial groups were, for
purposes ofThe Civil Rights Act, categorized as White or non-White.
B. Shaare Tefila Congregation and Saint Francis College Extended
Protection under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to Jews and Arabs
In 1987 companion cases, Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb47 and
Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji,48 the Supreme Court answered this
knotty question of classification and statutory scope with regard to Jews
and Arabs. The Court held that The Civil Rights Act of 1866 protected
both Jews49 and Arabs 5 -- although classified by modern convention as
'Caucasoid' 5 -from racial discrimination targeted at them by Whites. The
Court reached this result without rejecting the premise that The Act does
not apply to discrimination by one member of a racial group against an-
41. 42 U.S.C. §5 1981-1982 (2006).
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. See McDonald, 427 U.S. at 287-96.
44. Id. at 287.
45. See Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 609-10.
46. See id.
47. 481 U.S. 615.
48. 481 U.S. 604.
49. Shaare Tefila Congregation, 481 U.S. at 617-18.
50. Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 604.
51. Id. at 610 n.4.
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other member of that group.s2 Indeed, this presumption runs throughout
the 1987 opinions.s3
The Court explained that the proper question was not whether Jews
or Arabs would currently be considered Caucasian, and therefore unable to
sue other Caucasians for discriminating against them for being Jews or
Arabs.14 Nor was it sufficient to show that the defendants were motivated
by racial animus, ss as the plaintiffs and their amici urged. 6 Rather, the
Court held that it was necessary to determine whether Jews and Arabs
"constitute[d] ... group[s] of people that Congress intended to protect,""7
at the time that it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866. This required the
52. Id. at 609-10 (rejecting only one premise of petitioner's argument that an Arab
could not sue a Caucasian under the Civil Rights Act. The petitioners contended that
because Arabs are considered Caucasian, and because The Civil Rights Act does not allow
suits against a person of the same race as the plaintiff, the plaintiff's claim was not cogniza-
ble. The court rejected only the first premise, on the grounds that Arabs were not
considered Caucasian in the 19th Century.).
53. See id.; Shaare Tefila Congregation, 481 U.S. at 617-18 ("[T]he Court of appeals
erred in holding that Jews cannot state a § 1982 claim against other White defendants.
That view rested on the notion that because Jews today are not thought to be members of
a separate race, they cannot make out a claim of racial discrimination within the meaning
of § 1982 .... Jews and Arabs were among the peoples then considered to be distinct races
and hence within the protection of the statute.Jews are not foreclosed from stating a cause
of action against other members of what today is considered to be part of the Caucasian
race.").
54. Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 613; Shaare Tefla Congregation, 481 U.S. at 617.
55. Shaare Tefila Congregation, 481 U.S. at 617.
56. Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 785 F.2d 523, 526 (4th Cir. 1986) ("The
Congregation maintains that Jews are not members of a racially distinct group and do not
wish to be so considered.") It is striking how desperately the Jewish plaintiffi and amici
such as the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith sought to avoid a Supreme Court
ruling that Jews were a separate race. Instead, they argued that even though Jews were not a
separate race, the defendants' irrational racist beliefs classified them as such, and this racial
animus should be sufficient under The Civil Rights Act. Shaare Tefila Congregation, 481 U.S.
at 616; see also Shaare Tefila Congregation, 785 F2d 523 (accepting the argument that Jews
are not a separate race, but dismissing the argument that subjective racial animus is within
the scope of The Civil Rights Act). The Holocaust looms large in this reflexive shying
from views that would classify Jews as a separate race. Shaare Tefila Congregation, 785 F.2d
523 at 530 (Wilkinson, J. Concurring) ("It is undeniable that the misguided view of the
racial distinctiveness ofJews has led to atrocities of no less consequence than those gener-
ated by other fallacious beliefs about race .... It is, of course, clear to this court, the district
court, and counsel that Jews are not, under any legitimate view, a distinct race"). Eco-
nomic factors may also serve as motivation. See KAREN BRODKIN, How JEWs BECAME
WHITE FOLKS: AND WHAT THAT SAYS ABOUT RACE IN AMERICA, 25-50 (Rutgers University
Press 1998) (arguing that current widespread Jewish prosperity results from the classifica-
tion of Jews as White after WWII; this enabled Jews to take advantage of federal programs,
such as FHA mortgages and GI Bill disbursements, that were often denied to people of
color).
57. Shaare Tefila Congregation, 481 U.S. at 617.
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Court to determine whether Jews and Arabs were considered distinct
518
races in 1866.
The Court began this inquiry by noting that "all those who might
be deemed Caucasian today were not thought to be of the same race at
the time [The Civil Rights Act of 1866] became law." 9 To determine the
scope of the term 'race' at this time, the Court looked to period diction-
aries and encyclopedias. Each source used 'race' to refer to what today
might be called ethnicity. For example, dictionaries "commonly referred
to race as a 'continued series of descendants from a parent who is called
the stock.' ,60 Encyclopedias "described race in terms of ethnic groups"
and categorized Finns, Swedes, Norwegians, Germans, Greeks, Italians,
Gypsies, Basques, Arabs and Hebrews, among others, as different races. 6 As
the Court noted, these separate 'races' are in fact what would now be
called 'ethnic groups.'62 Furthermore, the legislative history of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 supported the belief that 'race,' as used in The Act, is
not restricted to supposed biological classifications, but also encompasses
ethnicity.
63
Thus, the term 'race,' as used in The Civil Rights Act of 1866, really
means 'ethnicity,' and an expansive notion of ethnicity at that. In fact, in
Saint Francis College the Supreme Court stated that even Englishmen and
Germans are not considered members of the same race for purposes of
The Act.64 Under this standard, Jews and Arabs are considered racially dis-
tinct from other Caucasians and their allegations of discrimination by
White defendants are actionable under the Act.65
58. Id. at 617-18.
59. Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 610.
60. Id. (quoting N. Webster, AN AmERicAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
666 (NO1830).
61. Id. at 611.
62. Id. The Court's use of dictionary definitions in this context has been criticized
as "contrived because those definitions undoubtedly were rooted in nineteenth century
bigotry." Jennifer Grace Redmond, Note, Redefining Race in Saint Francis College v. A]-
Khazraji and Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb: Using Dictionaries Instead of the Thirteenth
Amendment, 42 VArND. L. REV. 209,214-15 (1989).
63. Id. at 612 (noting that "the debates are replete with references" to races such as
Scandinavian, German, Anglo-Saxon, Mexican, Black, Latin, and Jewish).
64. Id.
65. The eligibility of Jews for protection under laws prohibiting racial discrimina-
tion is apparently still a matter of some controversy and confusion. In 2006, the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights voted to recommend that Education Department officials
act to protect students from anti-Semitism under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
TitleVI prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin by any insti-
tution that receives federal funds. The chairman of the Commission voted against the
recommendation as beyond the powers of the Education Department's Office for Civil
Rights. The chairman argued that the Office for Civil Rights investigates cases of dis-
crimination based on race and national origin, and that since Judaism is a religion, anti-
Semitism does not fall within the office's jurisdiction. Jennifer Jacobson, Civil-Rights
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The Civil Rights Act of 1866
C. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 Prohibits Only Discrimination Based on
Genetic Membership in an Ethnic Group
In order for a Jew or Arab to bring a claim under The Civil Rights
Act, it is not sufficient to show merely that Jews and Arabs were consid-
ered distinct races from other Whites in 1866. As the Supreme Court has
repeatedly stated, The Civil Rights Act prohibits only racial discrimina-
66tion.
The Supreme Court defined racial discrimination under The Act in
the 1987 companion cases.67 For purposes of The Act, a plaintiff shows
that she was a victim of racial discrimination if she can demonstrate that
she was "subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of [her]
ancestry or ethnic characteristics. 68 Arguably, this disjunctive language sug-
gests that racial discrimination under The Act encompasses two distinct
categories: (1) 'ancestry' discrimination, which refers to genetic features usu-
ally associated with race, and (2) 'ethnic characteristics' discrimination,
which is based on cultural features such as language or traditional prac-
69tices. For example, the actions of a defendant who becomes irate at the
sound of spoken Hebrew, regardless of whether the speaker is Jewish (or is
perhaps instead a non-Jewish ancient languages scholar), could be thought
of as ethnic characteristics discrimination, because the Hebrew language is
a prominent 'characteristic' of Jewish ethnicity. 70 This would not be con-
sidered 'ancestry' discrimination, because our defendant is disinterested in
the actual ancestry of the plaintiff. Nonetheless, this discrimination might
qualify as racial discrimination under the disjunctive reading of The Act.
According to this view, the plaintiff only has to prove 'ancestry' discrini-
nation or 'ethnic characteristics' discriination-not both.
Panel Urges Federal Monitoring of Campus Anti-Semitism, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER
EDUCATION, Apr. 14, 2006 at A27. Cf Shaare Tefla Congregation, 785 F at 530 (Wilkinson,J.
Concurring) ("It is, of course, clear ... that Jews are not, under any legitimate view, a dis-
tinct race, but are in fact members of a religious community with a rich cultural
heritage.")
66. Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 613 (1987) (noting that discrimination based on
religion does not lead to a Civil Rights Act claim); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.,
427 U.S. 273, 285 (1976); Rachel, 384 U.S. at 791 (1966) ("Congress intended to protect a
limited category of rights, specifically defined in terms of racial equality.").
67. Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 604; Shaare Tefila Congregation, 481 U.S. at 615.
68. Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 613.
69. Cf Elkhatib v. Dunkin' Donuts Inc., No. 02 C 8131, 2004 WL 2600119 at *3
N.D. Ill. (Nov. 15, 2004) (arguing that 5 1981 encompasses discrimination against an Arab
based on Arab "racial traditions" prohibiting the sale of pork.).
70. Cf 29 C.F.R. 5 1606.1 (2005) cited in Oranika v. City of Chicago, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 24024 at *8 (N.D. 111. Oct. 17, 2005) (explaining that national origin dis-
crimination under Title VII includes discrimination based on place of birth, "or because an
individual has the physical, cultural, or linguistic characteristics of a national origin group." (emphasis
added)).
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However, this reading is contradicted by other language in Saint
Francis College, in which the Court clearly stated that The Act applies only
to discrimination that occurs because of the victim's genetic status as a
member of an ethnic group. As the Court said, The Act prohibits only "dis-
crimination against an individual 'because he or she is genetically part of an
ethnically ... distinctive sub-grouping of homo sapiens. - 71 When this
statement is compared to the earlier language that states that racial discrimi-
nation occurs when someone is "subjected to intentional discrimination
solely because of [her] ancestry or ethnic characteristics"' 72 it becomes clear
that 'ancestry' and 'ethnic characteristics' are not separate categories, but are,
rather, synonyms. This means that the disjunctive reading-according to
which discrimination based solely on so-called "ethnic characteristics,"
but divorced from actual ancestry, is actionable under the Civil Rights
Act-must be incorrect.
Therefore The Civil Rights Act of 1866 prohibits only discrimina-
tion that is, first, directed towards a member of a protected ethnic class,
and second, based on his or her genetic membership in that class. For ex-
ample, the Arab plaintiff in Saint Francis College could only prevail on his
1982 claim if he could prove that at least some of the discrimination he
faced was simply because he was, genetically speaking, an Arab. 3 Dis-
crimination based on any other characteristics perhaps associated with
such Arab genetic status, such as Muslim religion or country of origin,
would not be actionable. 4
D.Jews Are Complicated:Jews Are Both an Ethnicity and a Religion and Have
Faced Religious and Racial Anti-Semitism
While the Supreme Court has held that Jews are a distinct race for
purposes of The Civil Rights Act of 1866, Jews are more than a distinct
race; Jews are also members of a shared religion.7' A person not born to
Jewish parents may convert to Judaism and is then considered a Jew.6 For
example, the 2001 National Jewish Population Survey in the United
States counted as a Jew any person who had at least one Jewish parent
(and who had not converted to another monotheistic religion) or whose
71. Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 613.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.; see also Elkhatib, 2004 WL 2600119 (rejecting a Section 1981 claim based on
such alleged discrimination).
75. Stehr &Weinstein, supra note 16, at 25.
76. See, e.g., United Jewish Communities, National Jewish Population Survey, 2, http://
www.ujc.org/local-includes/downloads/temp/njps2000-01_revised 1.06.04.pdf (last visited
March 18, 2007).
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religion is Jewish." In most cases, Jewish religion and Jewish ancestry
overlap.s
Given this two-dimensional religious and racial identity, Jews have
also historically been subjected to two distinctive types of anti-Semitism:
racial anti-Semitism based on Jewish ancestry, and religious anti-Semitism,
based on Jewish beliefs and behaviors.79
Racial anti-Semitism has been a more recent phenomenon, typified
by the Nazis and the 1935 passage of their Nuremberg Laws, which clas-
sified Germans into Jewish and non-Jewish persons based on principles of
heredity.'s The history of, and main distinctions between, these two types
of hatred are lucidly explained by Jay Weinstein and Nico Stehr:
It has been widely observed that [the ancestral anti-Semitism
enshrined in the Nuremberg laws] represents a significant de-
parture from traditional forms of anti-Semitism. For nearly two
millennia the Jews of Europe had been viewed as 'different'
(marginals, outsiders, and in many instances pariahs) because
they refused to accept Christ as their Messiah and, according to
Church doctrine, belatedly revoked in 1968, because they were
responsible for the Saviour's death. Although these beliefs and
the exclusionary practices based on them made life difficult for
Jews, they also allowed for the possibility of exculpation through
conversion. Moreover, since even a Jewish mother and father
could produce a Christian child, the religion of one's parents
was not necessarily grounds for exclusion, persecution or execu-
tion. 'The world without Jews' envisioned by European
Christians prior to World War I was one in which all former
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., id., at 29-30 (classifying over 90% of those of Jewish background as
Jews). This does not, however, mean that "Jewish faith" and "Jewish ethnicity" are equiva-
lent statuses. Courts surprisingly frequently do not understand this, and use the terms as
though they were synonyms. See, e.g., Sinai v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 3 F3d. 471,
472-73 (discussing the plaintiff's racial discrimination suit under § 1981, and finding "per-
tinent" that his employer had hired "several adherents of the Jewish faith." The court also
repeatedly refers to the plaintiff's ethnicity as "Jewish/Hebrew."); See also Rosenbaum v.
Bd. ofTr. of Montgomery Cmty Coll., 1999 WL 182358 at *3 (4th Cir. March 19, 1999)
(dismissing the plaintiff's claim of ethnic discrimination, in part because "the Defendants
have not engaged in discriminatory practices against those of the Jewish faith.") (emphasis
added). This represents a troubling analytic sloppiness; evidence of a defendant's hiring
practices with regard to religion seems hardly relevant to a claim of ethnic or racial dis-
crimination.
79. Stehr & Weinstein, supra note 16, at 4-5; see also Bachman v. St. Monica's Con-
gregation, 902 F2d 1259, 1260-61 (1990).
80. Id.
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Jews will have joined the faith--or, as in Karl Marx's secular-
ized formulation, will have stopped behaving 'like Jews.'
As Weinstein and Stehr emphasize, racial anti-Semitism, as per the Nazis,
targets Jews because of their ancestry. As a result, there is no action that a
Jew can take to protect herself. On the other hand, religious anti-
Semitism, as per the Catholic Church or even Marx, targets Jews because
of their religious affiliation with Judaism, following of Jewish doctrine,
and Jewish practices.82 This hatred, however, can be appeased if a Jew
chooses to believe and behave differently. More generally and drastically,
racial anti-Semitism can only be satisfied when there are no more people
with Jewish blood in their veins. Religious anti-Semitism can be satisfied
when there are no more adherents to Judaism.
E. The Civil Rights Act Purports to Reach Only Racial Anti-Semitism
The complication is that the Supreme Court has repeatedly declared
that The Civil Rights Act of 1866 does not reach religious discrimination,
but only racial discrimination.8 3 Therefore, it would seem that when a Jew
brings a claim under The Act alleging that she was discriminated against
for being Jewish, the courts must engage in the same inquiry as they
would for any other such plaintiff they must determine whether the
plaintiff's claim is really one of racial discrimination. If it is instead a claim
of religious discrimination, it should not be cognizable under The Act. As
the Court in Saint Francis College stated, The Civil Rights Act reaches
"discrimination against an individual because he or she is genetically part
of an ethnically ... distinctive sub-grouping of homo sapiens. Put dif-
ferently, The Act reaches only racial animus."'
81. Id. (internal citations omitted). There is some disagreement among courts and
commentators as to when racial anti-Semitism emerged. According to Stehr and
Weinstein, this was a tragic development of the Twentieth Century, a view which Judge
Posner, in a historical review lacking any references or citations, seems to endorse. Bach-
man, 902 F2d at 1260-61. The brief of the Anti-Defamation League differs, and suggests
that racial anti-Semitism emerged in the 15th Century. Brief of the Anti-Defamation
League of B'nai B'rith, page 11 (quoting B. LEwIs, SEMITS AND ArrI-SEMIES, 81 (1986)).
82. Cf Bachman, 902 F2d at 1260-61 ("There is religious anti-Semitism, ... and
racial anti-Semitism .... The one objects to Jews because of their religion, the other ob-
jects to Jews because they are descended from Jews, even if they are converts to other
faiths.").
83. Saint Francis Coll. v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) (noting that dis-
crimination based on religion does not lead to a § 1981 claim); see also Shaare Tefila
Congregation v. Cobb 481 U.S. 615(1987) (ignoring the obvious potential religious dis-
crimination claims of plaintiffi).
84. Saint Francis Coil., 481 U.S. at 613 (emphasis added).
85. See Shaare Tefila Congregation, 481 U.S. at 617.
[VOL. 12:537
The Civil Rights Act of 1866
Shaare Tefila Congregation did not require the Supreme Court to
grapple with this issue, as it was easy to determine that the defendants
86acted out of racial, and not religious, animus. The defendants in that case
defaced the outside walls of the Shaare Tefila Congregation with spray-
painted swastikas, Ku Klux Klan symbols, and threatening anti-Semitic
slogans including "Death to the Jude," "In, Take a Shower Jew" "Toten
Kamf Raband," and "Dead Jew.,87 Their use of Holocaust imagery and
Nazi and Klan symbols clearly indicated that the defendants were adher-
ents to a doctrine of racial anti-Semitism. 8
III. LEBLANC-STERNBERG AND SINGER HELD THAT ORTHODOX JEWS WERE
PROTECTED BY THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF I866 AGAINST DISCRIMINATION
BASED ON JEWISH RELIGIOUS PRACTICE
Nonetheless, despite the Supreme Court's repeated statements that
The Civil Rights Act only reaches discrimination based on ancestry, two
Federal District Courts have applied The Act to cases of discrimination
based upon Jewish religious practice.
A. In LeBlanc-Sternberg the Court Held that Racial and Religious
Discrimination Are Hard to Distinguish, and There Is no Need to Try
In the 1970s and 1980s, the number of Orthodox (predominantly
Hasidic) Jews residing in Ramapo, New York-an unincorporated town-
ship-rose substantially. In fact, by 1986, Orthodox Jews constituted
approximately 23,000 out of the 94,000 residents of Ramapo. 9 The total
Jewish population of the township was much higher.90
Many non-Jewish and non-Orthodox residents of Ramapo reacted
to this growth with hostility. These residents formed the Airmont Civic
86. Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 785 E2d 523, 524-25 (4th Cir. 1986). The
racial character of the defendants' actions was never challenged in the Court of Appeals or
in the Supreme Court.
87. Id.
88. While the defendants targeted a synagogue-a Jewish religious site-it is hard
to imagine that they chose this site out of some doctrinal disagreement with Judaism;
almost certainly they attacked a synagogue because synagogues, like Jewish Community
Centers, are visible symbols ofJewish presence.
89. Glaberson, supra note 2; LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 781 F Supp. 261, 263
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); see also Brian S. Sokoloff, Airmont Case Presents Zoning Issues in Freedom of
Religion Context, NEw YORK LAW JouRNAL, January 6, 1994, at 1 (describing the growth in
Orthodox and Hasidic population in Ramapo as "[a]kin to a rolling snowball, as more
came, the kosher food vendors, yeshivas and places of worship that opened attracted still
more people").
90. LeBlanc-Sternberg, 781 E Supp at 263.
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Association in order to incorporate their area of Ramapo as the village of
Airmont and, consequently, gain control of the local zoning process. Be-
cause Orthodox Jews do not drive on the Sabbath, home synagogues
were essential to the expansion of Hasidic neighborhoods away from es-
tablished synagogues. 91 The Village of Airmont could therefore contain the
expansion of Hasidic neighborhoods by enacting zoning laws that pre-
vented the establishment of home synagogues in new housing
developments.9 2 This anti-Hasidic animus was the express impetus for the
93incorporation movement. As one village trustee allegedly stated at a
public meeting, "We all know that the purpose is to keep those Orthodox
from Brooklyn out of here.!9 4 Other speakers declared that they would
not stand for a Hasidic community in their backyard, and some "forecast a
grim picture of a Hasidic belt" stretching across part of upstate New
York.9
There is nothing to suggest that the Village of Airmont was estab-
lished out of opposition to a general increase in the Jewish population,
especially as many non-observant Jews already resided in the area. Instead,
the incorporation movement was driven purely by opposition to the in-
flux of Hasidic or Orthodox Jews, specifically. Hasidic and Orthodox Jews
were described as "'foreigners and interlopers', 'ignorant and uneducated"
and 'an insult to' the community."96 They were also allegedly referred to as
"a bunch of people who insist on living in the past"'7  and "a tent-
dwelling society."8 Jews and non-Jews alike participated in this anti-
Hasidic hostility, and this was not the first time that other Jews had tried
to prevent Hasidic Jews from entering their community. In a nearly iden-
tical zoning dispute litigated in 1979, there were thirty-seven named
defendants: thirty-three of them, or 89 percent, were Jewish.1 0
91. Id. at 264; Jacques Steinberg,. Claim of Rights Violation of Hasidic Jews Is Rejected,
N.YTIMES, December 15, 1993, at B5.
92. LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F3d 412, 418 (2d Cir. 1995) [hereinafter
LeBlanc-Sternberg II] (appealing LeBlanc-Sternberg, 781 F Supp 261 on grounds unrelated to
the Civil Rights Act).
93. LeBlanc-Sternberg II, 67 E3d at 418-19 (noting that a later suggestion that the
Airmont Civic Association start an initiative to plant trees was met with groans of derision,
because, as one Association member stated, the "only reason" that the village was incorpo-
rated was to keep the Hasidim out).
94. Glaberson, supra note 2, at B2.
95. LeBlanc-Sternberg 11, 67 F3d at 418.
96. Id. at 430.
97. LeBlanc-Sternberg 11, 67 F3d at 418; see also Weiss v.Willow Tree Civic Ass'n, 467
E Supp. 803, 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (reporting, in a case with nearly identical facts, that a
prime motivation for opposition to Hasidic neighbors was "the peculiar way of life of
'these people.' ").
98. Glaberson, supra note 2, at B2.
99. Id.
100. Weiss, 467 F Supp. at 816 n.48.
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After his petition to establish a home synagogue was denied, Rabbi
LeBlanc-Sternberg sued the trustees of the Village of Airmont and the
Town of Ramapo under § 1982, alleging that the defendants violated the
Hasidim's right to use and enjoy property. In reply, the defendants asserted
that "their alleged discriminatory acts were addressed solely to the plain-
tiffs' affiliation as Orthodox Jews. They suggest that the complaint is
framed in terms which claim religious-based discrimination in that any
discrimination was directed toward the plaintiffs' lifestyle as dictated by
the tenets of plaintiffs' religion."'10 ' This characterization of the complaints
is clearly accurate, based on the newspaper and trial record. 10 2 The defen-
dants further argued that since § 1982 does not cover religious
discrimination, the plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed.
0 3
The court agreed with the defendants that the plaintiffs' complaint
alleged religious discrimination. Nonetheless, the court ruled that the
plaintiffs' claims were cognizable under the Act. The court reasoned as
follows:
The complaint does assert that the plaintiffs suffered discrimi-
nation because they were Orthodox Jews. However, that makes
no difference. Sections 1981 and 1982 were "intended to pro-
tect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons who are
subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their
ancestry or ethnic characteristics." Because Jewish culture, an-
cestry, and ethnic identity are intricately bound up with Judaic
religious beliefs, racial and religious discrimination against Jews
cannot be as easily distinguished as defendants would have it.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that Jews
are entitled to the protections of % 1981 and 1982 because
Jews were considered to be a separate race in 1870 when those
statutes became law.We need not inquire any further.
0 4
When confronted with Hasidic Jews who, the court acknowledged,
claimed that they were discriminated against for their religious practice,
the court said that it could not distinguish between religious and ancestral
anti-Semitism, and there was no need to try.
This is nonsense.While there may be some cases in which religious
and racial anti-Semitism are hard to distinguish, this was not one of them.
In the 1979 zoning dispute, which has nearly identical facts, the same dis-
trict court had no trouble discerning that "the true nature and essence of
[the] complaint" was that the Hasidim were discriminated against because
101. LeBlanc-Sternberg, 781 F. Supp. at 267.
102. See LeBlanc-Sternberg 11, 67 F. 3d at 418; id. at 430; LeBlanc-Sternberg 781 F Supp.
at 264 ; Glaberson, supra note 2.
103. LeBlanc-Sternberg, 781 F Supp at 267.
104. Id. at 267-68 (internal citations omitted).
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of "their religion, manner of dress and life style," and was therefore not
cognizable under § 1982. '°0 Granted, the 1979 case occurred before Jews
were officially classified as a protected race under The Act by Shaare Tefila
Congregation. However, it is unclear what part of Shaare Tefila Congregation
removed the well-entrenched restriction that The Civil Rights Act applies
only to racial discrimination. Also, to the extent that any of the defendants
in LeBlanc-Sternberg were themselves Jewish-as seems highly likely given
the similarity to the 1979 case-the requirement that the plaintiff and
defendant be of different races would have immediately blocked the
plaintiff's claims as to those defendants. Thus, the district court appears to
have utterly misapplied the doctrine that emerges from Shaare Tefila Con-
gregation and Saint Francis College, which is the following: it is not enough
for the plaintiffs to be members of a protected group; they must also
complain of racial discrimination and be of a different racial group than
the defendants.
B. In Singer the Court Held That the Nature of the
Alleged Discrimination Is Irrelevant
Perhaps even more curious than LeBlanc-Sternberg is the strange case
ofYishai Singer. Jesse Hernandez was a Hispanic teacher for the Denver
Public Schools from 1986 to 1994.106 In 1989-1990, he converted to Ju-
daism, became a Hasid, and changed his name to Yishai Singer. In 1994,
Singer submitted a letter of resignation to the district in which he stated,
"I have been subjected to a hostile work environment for members of the
Jewish religion and for Hispanics. I cannot tolerate any more anti-semitic
[sic] or racist conduct.'
0 7
Singer's specific allegations of hostility were almost all related to his
religion. As the court noted, Singer believed his principal was hostile to
him "because Singer is a Chassidic Jew."'' 0 Singer alleged many incidents
of hostility towards his Orthodox beliefs and Hasidic dress, but none of
these reflected racial animus towards Jewish ancestry (Which, as a convert,
Singer lacked in the first place). For example, Singer alleged that the prin-
cipal "continually made anti-Semitic remarks about his Chassidic clothing
and appearance, criticizing his kippah/yarmulke, long black coat, side
locks of hair and long beard."' 0 9 This anti-Hasidic animus was directed not
only at Singer's dress and appearance but also at his Orthodox religious
convictions:
105. Weiss, 467 E Supp. at 816.
106. Singer, 959 E Supp. at 1326-27.
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[The principal] made anti-Semitic remarks to him regarding
the eating of pork, and intentionally interfered with his Sab-
bath observance.... [The principal] used profane language
when disciplining him, which ... [the principal] knew to of-
fend his religious sensibilities .... [D]espite his request, he was
not provided with a kosher meal at a luncheon he was re-
quired to attend. ... [The principal] pressured him to violate
his religious beliefs by ordering him to attend graduation
ceremonies where women would be singing."
Singer himself seems to have conceptualized this all as religious discrimi-
nation: He stated that "he frequently accused [his superior] of religious
harassment,""' and claimed that he was discriminated against for being of
the Jewish religion. 1 2 At a basic logical level it could not be any other
way-as a convert, Singer is Jewish, but he is not ofJewish ancestry.There-
fore any discrimination that he experienced for being Jewish could not be
racial anti-Semitism, based on Jewish parentage, but would instead be dis-
crimination based on his Jewish beliefs and practices-religious anti-
Semitism.
The school district and Singer's principal brought motions for
summary judgment. ' 3 The school district's motion asserted that, for tech-
nical reasons based on the interaction of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1981, the
district could not be liable to Singer under The Act. The court agreed."
4
Singer's principal argued that The Act "does not apply to religious dis-
crimination and the claim should be dismissed insofar as it is based on
such discrimination.''''
5
Singer argued that Shaare Tefila Congregation was a sufficient basis for
his claim, stating that since "Jews are a distinct race for civil rights pur-
poses .... discrimination against him on the basis of his being Jewish is
actionable under § 1981. ,116 The court accepted Singer's logic and ruled
against the principal. The court reasoned that "[s]ince Singer is claiming
he was discriminated against as a Jew, a distinct racial group for the pur-
poses of§ 1981, Defendants are not entitled to judgment on the basis that
he is claiming religious discrimination.
'"'' 7
There are two things that are deeply surprising about the holding in
Singer. First, because Singer had no Jewish ancestry, he could not claim
that he faced discrimination based on his Jewish ancestry. Because racial
110. Id. at 1328.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1327.
113. Id. at 1329.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1330.
116. Id. at 1331.
117. Id.
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discrimination under The Civil Rights Act is equivalent to ancestral dis-
crimination, Singer's lack of Jewish ancestry should have been fatal to his
claim. "8 Moreover, even if Singer's tormentors mistakenly thought that
Singer had Jewish ancestry, and discriminated against him for that reason,
this would still have been insufficient. Mistaken racial animus towards
someone who is not actually a member of a group protected by Congress
is irrelevant for purposes of The Act." 9 Second, the discriminatory inci-
dents upon which Singer based his claim were not racial in nature.
Indeed, Singer and the court both described them as expressions of reli-
gious animus, which has long been beyond the scope of The Act.
1 20
Nevertheless, the district court ruled that this was all irrelevant. The rea-
son:Jews are "a distinct racial group for the purposes of§ 1981.
''
121
IV. THESE CASES Do NOT MAKE SENSE UNDER TRADITIONAL CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF I866 DOCTRINE, NOR Do THEY FIT WITH OTHER RECENT CASES
The application of The Civil Rights Act of 1866 to religious dis-
crimination in Singer and LeBlanc-Sternberg is clearly out of line with the
Court's earlier jurisprudence regarding The Act. However, it is possible
that the 1987 cases-which held that a 'White' plaintiff could sue a
'White' defendant for racial discrimination, so long as they were of differ-
ent ethnic groups-marked a sea-change in the doctrine. Perhaps, by
expanding race to ethnicity, and specifically by including Jews as a recog-
nized race, these cases implicitly changed the doctrine from a narrow
prohibition against racial animus to something broader-maybe even in-
cluding religious discrimination. 122 This section will re-examine Shaare
Tefila Congregation, Saint Francis College, and other later cases that did not
involve Orthodox Jews and conclude that this is not a correct explanation
of LeBlanc-Sternberg and Singer.
118. Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 613. Singer, as a convert, certainly possessed many of
the "ethnic characteristics" of Jews, but, as shown in Part II, discrimination based upon
such characteristics, absent genetic membership in a protected (and targeted) group is
insufficient to underwrite a claim under The Act.
119. See Shaare Tefila Congregation, 481 U.S. at 616-17 (rejecting the plaintiff's argu-
ment that subjective racial animus is sufficient to underwrite a Civil Rights Act claim).
120. Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 613 (noting that discrimination based on religion
does not lead to a Civil Rights Act claim); see also Shaare Tefila Congregation, 481 U.S.
615 (ignoring the obvious potential religious discrimination claims of plaintiffi).
121. Singer, 959 E Supp. at 1331.
122. Cf Gold v. Gallaudet Coll., No. 86-7079 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 17616 at *12
(D.C. Cir., Nov. 20, 1987) ("[T]he district court held that § 1981 creates a cause of action
for racial discrimination not discrimination on the basis of sea [sic] and religion as alleged
by Cold [sic]. The Supreme Court's rulings in Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, and its
companion case, Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, however, strongly suggest that § 1981
creates a cause of action for persons suffering discrimination on the basis of their religious
or ethnic identity.") (internal citations omitted).
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A. A Plain Reading of the 1987 Cases Does not Suggest
the Results in the Hasidic Cases
There is some very opaque language in Saint Francis College and
Shaare Tefila Congregation that might support the rulings in LeBlanc-
Sternberg and Singer. Quoting its ruling in Saint Francis College, the Shaare
Tefila Congregation court stated that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was "in-
tended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons who
are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry
or ethnic characteristics.' ' 3 This might mean that so long as a particular
ethnic group has historically been subjected to racial animus, The Civil
Rights Act prohibits any type of discrimination based on or associated
with membership in that group.
However, this reading is inconsistent with the whole of the 1987
companion cases. Elsewhere in the same opinions, the Court stated that
The Act prohibits "discrimination against an individual because he or she is
genetically part of an ethnically ... distinctive sub-grouping of homo
sapiens."'25 Whereas the previous passage did not discuss the type of dis-
crimination actually complained of by the plaintiff (but, rather, that to
which her group is subjected), this passage addresses the nature of the
plaintiff's complaint. Its plain meaning is that only discrimination that is
actually based on the plaintiff's ancestry-racial or ancestral animus-is
prohibited.
Thus, under the 1987 cases, both elements are necessary: the plaintiff
must be a genetic member of a group that Congress intended to protect,
and the plaintiff must complain of discrimination that occurred because
of that genetic membership. There is nothing in Shaare Tefila Congregation
to suggest that, as a matter of doctrine, Jews are exempted from this re-
quirement. Shaare Tefila Congregation only resolved the question as to
whether Jews were considered a separate race and so eligible to bring suit
against Caucasian defendants under The Act. The case did not address any
issues of Jewish exceptionality as to racial and religious identity and dis-
crimination.1 26 Jews, like all other groups, may have recourse to The Act
only for claims of racial or ancestral discrimination.
123. Shaare Tefila Congregation, 481 U.S. at 617, quoting Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at
613.
124. Shaare Teflla Congregation, 481 U.S. at 615; Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 604.
125. Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 613 (emphasis added).
126. Shaare Tefila Congregation, 481 U.S. at 617-18.
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B. Other Recent Cases Continue to Rule Religious Discrimination Beyond
The Scope of the Civil Rights Act
Nonetheless, it is possible that district courts, picking up on subtle
hints in the 1987 cases, have begun applying The Civil Rights Act broadly
to cases that do not allege racial animus. This would mean that LeBlanc-
Sternberg and Singer are in fact in line with modern interpretations of
Shaare Tefila Congregation. This is not the case. Instead, LeBlanc-Sternberg
and Singer, in which The Act was applied broadly to Hasidic Jews, stand in
contradistinction to two other recent cases in which The Act was applied
traditionally and narrowly to an Arab and a non-Orthodox Jew.
First, The Act has not been applied broadly to plaintiffs of other eth-
nicities, only to Jews. In 2004, the Northern District of Illinois decided a
case in which an Arab-American franchisee of Dunkin' Donuts, Walid
Elkhatib, brought suit under The Act alleging that he was discriminated
against because he would not sell pork products in his restaurant.127 Elk-
hatib claimed that this discrimination was based on race because "his
race's traditions and religious practices" prohibited him from selling
pork. 12s The court rejected this, stating that since the dietary restrictions
Elkhatib pointed to were associated with religion, and not race, his claim
was one of religious discrimination and could not proceed under The
Act. 129
This suggests that Singer and LeBlanc-Sternberg do not represent a
general trend away from the animus-based-on-genetic-membership re-
quirement but perhaps that Jews occupy a unique place. For example,
American Arabs are mostly not Muslims, °30 and not all Muslims are Arabs.
Therefore, Islamic practice is not a proxy for Arab ancestry, and Islamic
practice does not constitute an Arab "racial tradition." On the other hand,
those who identify religiously as Jews are overwhelmingly of Jewish an-
cestry and vice-versa. 3 1 Perhaps, for this reason, Jewish religion could be
seen as a proxy for Jewish ancestry, such that when a Jew complains of
religious discrimination under The Act, a court need not inquire fur-
ther. 
132
However, a second court did not have any trouble distinguishing be-
tween religious and racial discrimination when the plaintiff was a non-
Orthodox Jew. This suggests that it is not just that Jews are unique, but
that Orthodox or Hasidic Jews, in particular, are unique. In 2000 the East-
127. Elkhatib v. Dunkin' Donuts Inc,, No. 02 C 8131, 2004 WL 2600119 (N.D. I11.
Nov. 15, 2004).
128. Id. at *3.
129. Id.
130. Id. at *3 n.3 (noting that "Seventy-five to eighty percent of the approximately
3.5 million Arab-Americans are Christians.").
131. National Jewish Population Survey supra note 15 (90% figure).
132. Cf LeBlanc-Sternberg, 781 E Supp. at 268.
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ern District of NewYork decided a § 1981 case in which a non-observant
Jew alleged that he was discriminated against by his employer for not be-
ing Orthodox and for being married to a Catholic.13 3 The court easily
determined that this was a claim of religious discrimination and was not
actionable under the Act:
Although the definition of race discrimination under Section
1981 is broad enough to include persons ofJewish descent, the
underlying claim must be that the plaintiff was discriminated
against based upon that ancestry. Kratz does not claim that he was
discriminated against because he is of Jewish descent. Quite on
the contrary, Kratz asserts that people of Jewish ancestry are fa-
vored in the hiring process provided that they are religiously
observant. Indeed, the core allegation of his complaint is reli-
gious discrimination for being a non-observant Jew.13
The ease with which the court dispatched with the issue shows that it is
not inherently difficult to classify discrimination against a Jew as racial or
religious (the rationale offered in LeBlanc-Sternberg1 31), nor are all Jews al-
lowed to bring religious discrimination claims under The Act (as Singer
might suggest136). It is only for Hasidic Jewish plaintiffs that courts allow
claims of religious discrimination to proceed under The Civil Rights Act
of 1866.137
133. Kratz v. College of Staten Island, No. 96-CV-0680, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5199
(E.D.N.Y, Mar. 15,2000), at *3.
134. Id. at *7-*8 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
135. LeBlanc-Sternberg, 781 F Supp. at 267-68 ("Because Jewish culture, ancestry, and
ethnic identity are intricately bound up with Judaic religious beliefi, racial and religious
discrimination against Jews cannot be as easily distinguished as defendants would have it.")
136. Singer v. Denver Sch. Dist. No. 1, 959 F. Supp. 1325 (1997) ("[s]ince Singer is
claiming he was discriminated against as a Jew, a distinct racial group for the purposes of
5 1981, Defendants are not entitled to judgment on the basis that he is claiming religious
discrimination.").
137. But see Sides v. NYS Div. of State Police, No. 03-CV-153, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis
12635 (N.D.N.Y,June 28, 2005) (summarily dismissing an Orthodox Jew's § 1981 claim
that he was discriminatorily denied employment because he would not work on the Sab-
bath. The court easily discerned that this was a religious discrimination claim, and hence
outside the scope of The Act. However, this case is distinguishable from Leblanc-Sternberg
and Singer. In those cases, the plaintiffs complained that they suffered discrimination based
solely on their status as Hasidic Jews. Here, the plaintiff alleged that he suffered discrimina-
tion because his Orthodox observance led to functional constraints that were unacceptable
to the employer. This distinction tracks the logic of Shaare Tefila Congregation, which limits
The Act to cases of discrimination based solely on membership in a group).
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V. PERHAPS RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION AGAINST HASIDIC JEWS Is
DISCRIMINATION 'ON THE BASIS OF RACE,' ALTHOUGH
MOTIVATED NOT BY RACIAL ANIMUS, BUT
BY NORMATIVE RACIAL STEREOTYPES.
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 still seems to require an inquiry as to
whether the plaintiff actually faced racial discrimination, thus far defined
as racial animus. Yet LeBlanc-Sternberg and Singer held that the Hasidic
plaintiffs alleging discrimination against them because of their Hasidic
practice did not need any further showing of racial discrimination. This
section will introduce the theory that racial discrimination may include
discrimination based on failure to conform to normative racial stereo-
types. It will suggest that the discrimination at issue in LeBlanc-Sternberg
and Singer invoked normative stereotypes for those of Jewish ancestry and
thus, constituted discrimination based on normative racial stereotypes.
Although the Court has characterized racial discrimination under The Act
as racial animus, perhaps The Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of
normative racial stereotypes as well.
A. 'Racial Discrimination' Might Include Normative Stereotypes
K. Anthony Appiah, a Harvard philosopher who often writes about
race and identity, has suggested that American antidiscrimination law cov-
ers at least three different sorts of stereotypes, or bases for discrimination.
He calls the first 'statistical stereotypes.' Statistical stereotypes ascribe a
property to an individual that is correctly believed to be characteristic of
some social group to which she belongs, but not necessarily characteristic
of her. For example, a strong woman would face discrimination based on
statistical stereotyping if she were denied a job as a firefighter on the
grounds that women are not strong enough to be firefighters. Appiah calls
the second type 'false stereotypes.' These ascribe to an individual some
false and maliciously derived characteristic of the group to which he be-
longs. As Appiah notes, the classic examples of false stereotypes are ethnic
stereotypes that prompt individuals to treat members of a certain group
poorly because of some imagined negative characteristics of the group.
1 38
In other words, racial or ethnic animus-which the Court has suggestedis te exent f T  Ac's ... 139
is the extent of The Act's prohibition -could be categorized as dis-
crimination based on false stereotypes.
Appiah calls his third category 'normative stereotypes.' As he ex-
plains, such "a stereotype is not a view about how members of the group
behave simpliciter It is grounded in a social consensus about how they
ought to behave to conform appropriately to the norms associated with
138. Appiah, supra note 27, at 63-64.
139. Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617 (1987).
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membership in that group." For example, "[w]hen employers require female
employees to wear dresses and male employees not to do so, they are in-
voking normative gender stereotypes., 140  Importantly, normative
stereotypes, as Appiah defines them, are distinct from general social norms.
Whereas general social norms apply equally to people of different groups,
and dictate behavior only in keeping with expectations of all members of
society, normative stereotypes dictate how members of a group should
behave "to conform appropriately to the norms associated with membership
in that group."141 Thus, whereas a requirement for female employees to
wear skirts and male employees not to do so would invoke normative
gender stereotypes, an employer's general requirement that employees
maintain a "professional appearance" would not.
An invocation of normative sex stereotypes can be considered "dis-
crimination on the basis of sex," even though an employer has not acted
on a prohibited statistical judgment nor exhibited animus towards women
or men.14 2 As the Supreme Court stated in 1989, "we are beyond the day
when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that
they matched the stereotype associated with their group.'' 43 In this case,
"assuming" that an employee matches a stereotype corresponds to
Appiah's conception of statistical stereotypes, and "insisting" that the em-
ployee matches a stereotype corresponds to normative stereotypes. Each
of these (as well as outright animus) represent a forbidden consideration
of sex, and are considered "discrimination on the basis of sex stereotypes,"
which is prohibited by Title VII.'"
The Supreme Court has held that gender discrimination law prohibits
normative stereotyping,14 and Appiah uses gender norms in his illustrations
of normative stereotypes. 4 6 LeBlanc-Sternberg and Singer suggest that race
discrimination law, specifically The Civil Rights Act of 1866, also prohibits
normative stereotyping, at least when it comes to Hasidic Jews.
140. Appiah, supra note 27, at 64-65 (emphasis-underline-added). However, Ap-
piah is not sure whether this specific invocation of normative stereotypes is so offensive as
to be unlawful. See alsoJespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 392 F3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2003)
(refusing to find gender-stereotyped grooming standards per se discriminatory).
141. Appiah, supra note 27, at 64 (emphasis added).
142. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250 ("In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an
employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she
must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.") (emphasis added).
143. Id. at 251.
144. See generally id.
145. Id. at 251.
146. Appiah, supra note 27, at 64-67.
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B. These Cases May Involve Normative Racial Stereotypes
and Therefore Racial Discrimination
As we have seen, LeBlanc-Sternberg and Singer found violations of
The Act in cases where there were no allegations of racial animus. To put
this in Appiah's terms, there were no allegations of 'false stereotypes" or
general animus toward Jews, and these were certainly not cases of'statisti-
cal stereotyping! However, they might be explained as cases of normative
stereotyping. These Hasidim faced discrimination based on their lifestyle
and religious practice, which clearly offended, in some way, the defen-
dants' normative beliefs as to appropriate behavior. It is likely that this
discrimination was not based merely on general social norms, but instead
specifically invoked normative ethnic stereotypes of Jews. This suggests
that the Hasidic plaintiffs would not have faced such hostility based on
their lifestyle, but for the fact that they were (Singer aside) ethnically Jew-
ish. In this regard, it is fair to say that they were discriminated against
because of their ethnicity.
Perhaps, then, these cases recognize "discrimination based on
normative racial stereotypes"-in which behaviors permitted to one
racial (or ethnic) group are denied to another-as within the scope of
The Civil Rights Act of 1866.' 47 This approach would explain both
doctrinal problems in LeBlanc-Sternberg: that religious discrimination-and
not racial animus-was alleged, and that some defendants were themselves
Jewish. Singer would also make more sense under this theory, although it
remains problematic that the plaintiff was not genetically Jewish.
1. Assimilation Is not Just a General Social Norm, But Has Exerted
Particularly Powerful Pressure on Jews
American Jewry has grappled with, and often conceded to, powerful
impulses towards assimilation throughout the twentieth century. Perhaps
as a result, the National Jewish Population Survey found that Orthodox
Jews have declined, and continue to decline, as a percentage of American
Jewry. Only 41% of those raised Orthodox currently consider themselves
147. See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 E3d, 566, 574 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that "an
employer who discriminates against women because, for instance, they do not wear dresses
or makeup, is engaging in sex discrimination because the discrimination would not occur
but for the victim's sex. It follows that employers who discriminate against men because
they do wear dresses and makeup, or otherwise act femininely, are also engaging in sex
discrimination, because the discrimination would not occur but for the victim's sex." Such
discrimination is actionable under Tide VII); see also Anna R. Kirkland, "hat's at Stake in
Transgender Discrimination as Sex Discrimination, 32 SIGNS: JOURNAL OF WOMEN IN CULTURE
AND Soci-ry 84, 97-98 (2006).
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Orthodox.' 48 For some Jews, as for my grandparents, being modern and
American was itself an ideal to which to aspire. Pressures to assimilate
have functioned both as broad societal expectations of Jews, as in religious
anti-Semitism, and have also became internalized as Jewish norms. 49 In
other words, assimilation reflects "a social consensus about how Uews]
ought to behave to conform appropriately to the norms associated with
[being Jewish].",5
Orthodox, and particularly Hasidic,Jews have often struggled against
these norms of the Un-kosher Land, which they view as detrimental to
authentic Jewish values.' As evidenced by the vitriol exhibited in the
New York zoning cases, this resistance to assimilation has come with a
price: animus and discrimination.
Arguably such anti-Hasidic discrimination invokes a general, ethnic-
ity-neutral, norm of assimilation that applies equally to all, Jews and non-
Jews. If so, the hostility in these cases could not be considered discrimina-
tion on the basis of racial stereotypes, as there would be no racial content
to the norm. Such hostility would therefore not qualify as discrimination
on the basis of race (or Jewish ethnicity), because it may be directed at
any ethnic group that fails to assimilate, rather then specifically at Jews.
However, I suggest that the discrimination against these Hasidim
based on their failure to assimilate occurred precisely because they are
Jewish, and so did invoke normative racial stereotypes. It should therefore
be considered discrimination on the basis of race. There is reason to be-
lieve that the opponents of Hasidic expansion in New York (and perhaps
Singer's principal as well) were not exhibiting a general dislike of tradi-
tional, non-Americanized religious practice. Instead, they were incensed
specifically because the Jewish plaintiffs engaged in such un-American,
such 'un-White', conduct.'5 2
A joke I received via e-mail some years ago illustrates this phe-
nomenon: A woman runs into a man on a street corner. He has a long
beard, and is wearing a dark suit and a black hat. She immediately accosts
him: "Why do you Hasidim dress as though you are still living in 
the 18 h
century? Why do you follow outmoded ways of thinking and customs
that spurn the marvels of modernity? Why do you separate yourselves
from the rest of American society-Do you think you're better than us?"
The man listens with a quizzical look on his face, turns to her, and says,
"Madame, I'm not Jewish; I'm Amish." She responds: "Oh! I think it's so
148. United Jewish Communities, National Jewish Population Survey: Orthodox Jews, 10,
(Feb. 2004) available at http://www.ujc.org/getfile.asp?id=4983 (last visited March 18,
2007).
149. FREEDMAN, supra note 26, at 13-41.
150. Appiah, supra note 27, at 63-64.
151. FREEDMAN, supra note 26, at 219-29.
152. See BRODKIN, supra note 55, at 26 n. 3 (suggesting that Hasidim "lack the privi-
leges of whiteness.")
SPRING 2007]
Michigan journal of Race & Law
nice that you people have kept your traditions!",5 3 The Amish lifestyle may
be fine, but the Hasidic is not.' 4 This suggests that hostility towards Hasi-
dic Jews does not merely reflect general norms of assimilation, but instead
specifically invokes normative stereotypes for Jewish ethnicity.'55 It should
therefore be conceived of as discrimination on the basis of ethnicity.
2. Normative Discrimination, Unlike Racial Animus,
Is Particularly Likely to Occur Among
Members of the Same Group
This hostility towards Orthodox and Hasidic Jews is, unfortunately,
common among Jews as well as non-Jews. For example, thirty-three out
of thirty-seven defendants in the 1979 Hasidic zoning case were them-
selves Jewish. 56 This hostility may arise because non-Orthodox Jews feel
that the non-assimilating behavior of their Orthodox brethren threatens
the economic and social gains that they have made via assimilation.
157
Non-orthodox Jews also may feel defensive about their level of Jewish
commitment or perhaps simply have a visceral antipathy towards a culture
that they view as close-minded. 5 " The preceding statements are doubly
153. The similarities between Amish and Hasidic dress have also provided fodder for
at least one other humorous incident. See THE FRisco KID (Warner Bros. 1979) (depicting
scene in which Polish Hasid Gene Wilder, newly arrived in the United States, mistakes an
Amish community for "lantsmen," or fellow Polish Jews. He is overcome by shock when
he finds out that in America even the "lantsmen" are gentiles.).
154. Cf Jane Ammeson, Indiana's Amish Country Takes You Back In Time, ANN ARBOR
NEWS, May 14, 2006 at H3 (extolling the virtues of visits to Amish country, in which
"young boys dressed in black hats ride their bikes to school ... , and there are times when
the streets resemble more a scene of the 19th century than one of the 2 1st," and encourag-
ing readers to "Slow down and experience the simple life") with LeBlanc-Sternberg II, 67
E3d at 430 (reporting derogatory references to Hasidim as "a bunch of people who insist
on living in the past"); LeBlanc-Sternberg II, 67 F3d at 430 (reporting derogatory references
to Hasidim as "foreigners and interlopers," and "ignorant and uneducated,") with Glaber-
son, supra note 2 at B2 (reporting derogatory references to Hasidim as "a tent-dwelling
society"); but see King v.Township of E. Lampeter, 17 F Supp. 2d 394, 417-18 (1998) (ad-
dressing, and dismissing, plaintiff's claim that he suffered discrimination on the basis of
Amish identity. However, it is important, and curious, to note that the plaintiff was not
himself practicing the Amish lifestyle. Id. at 404.).
155. For purposes of this comparison, it is irrelevant that the Amish are not consid-
ered a separate ethnic group under The Act. King, 17. F Supp. 2d at 417-18. Hasidic Jews
are also not considered a separate ethnic group, but are a religious grouping within those
who are Jewish. See, e.g., LeBlanc-Sternberg, 781 F Supp. 264.
156. Weiss, 467 F Supp. at 816.
157. See generally BRODKIN, supra note 55 (documenting the gains that Jews made
through assimilation, and classification as 'White'); FREEDMAN, supra note 26.
158. See generally FREEDMAN, supra note 26; see also LeBlanc-Sternberg II, 67 E3d at 430
(reporting characterization of Hasidim as "ignorant and uneducated."); ALAN M. DER-
SHOWITZ, THE VANISHING AMERICAN JEW 55 (Little Brown & Co. 1997) ("The great
paradox of Jewish life is that virtually all of the positive values we identify with Jews-
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true with regard to relations between non-Orthodox and Hasidic Jews.
Moreover, American Jews generally don't have a problem with people of
other ethnicities rigorously following their own cultures. As the joke
(Which is sometimes told with a non-Orthodox Jew as the antagonist)
indicates, this is usually celebrated as multi-culturalism. In contrast, adher-
ence to Orthodoxy, and particularly the separatism of Hasidism, is seen as
a threatening affront, and often inspires hostility.
The theory that The Civil Rights Act of 1866 prohibits discrinmina-
tion on the basis of normative racial stereotypes might explain why
LeBlanc-Sternberg did not instantly dismiss the claims against Jewish defen-
dants. Whereas the Court could not imagine that a person would hate
another solely for a shared genetic membership, we might expect to see
normative discrimination occur precisely between members of the same
group, as they are likely the most invested in determining and enforcing
the proper norms for that group.159 In LeBlanc-Sternberg, the non-
Orthodox Jewish neighbors were hostile to the Hasidic Jews because they
differed greatly over the appropriate norms associated with Jewishness.
Assuming that the Civil Rights Act really includes discrimination on the
basis of normative racial stereotypes, it would be paradoxical to refuse to
recognize such discrimination precisely in those situations in which it
might be most likely to occur.
VI. CONCLUSION
In two cases, federal district courts extended The Civil Rights Act of
1866 to discrimination directed towards religious practice. These cases are
not consistent with Supreme Court doctrine nor with more recent lower
court cases, which require racial discrimination. However, these two cases
might be conceptualized as redefining racial discrimination to include
"discrimination based on normative stereotypes for race" as well as dis-
crimination based on pure racial animus. The prohibition against gender
discrimination under Title VII already encompasses discrimination on the
basis of sex stereotypes, including normative sex stereotypes. 16 Perhaps
this logic is making its way into Civil Rights Act jurisprudence. In these
compassion, creativity, contributing to the world at large, charity, a quest for education-
seem more characteristic of Jews who are closer to the secular end of the Jewish contin-
uum than to the Ultra-Orthodox end. Put another way, the closer one lives to the
religious core ofJudaism, the further one is likely to be from the Jewish values so many of
us cherish most."); id. at 57 ("We do not want our children to be like [the Hasidim and
Ultra-Orthodox]. They do not produce-at least not directly-the great scientists, artists,
philanthropists of whom we are so proud.").
159. See generally FREEDMAN, supra note 26, whose very title Jew vs.Jew: The Struggle for
the Soul ofAmericanjewry, suggests the sort of pitched battle that can occur between those
with different views of appropriate group norms.
160. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250-51.
SPRING 2007]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
cases, it is likely that the Hasidic plaintiffs faced discrimination based on
their failure to assimilate into American culture not because they violated
a general norm of assimilation, but rather because they did not conform to
normative stereotypes for those of Jewish ethnicity. The resulting dis-
crimination based on normative stereotypes might therefore be
considered discrimination that occurred because of their race. At least in
the special case of Hasidic Jews, the cases suggest that The Civil Rights
Act of 1866 prohibits both racial animus and use of normative racial
stereotypes.
This result is within the logic, if not the established doctrine of The
Act.161 This expansion contradicts the doctrine in the following three
ways. First, the Supreme Court has specifically used the words "racial
animus" to describe the type of racial discrimination that The Civil
, 162
Rights Act prohibits. According to Appiah's classifications, racial animus
derives from false stereotypes, and so is quite distinct from discrimination
based on normative stereotypes. The Court's characterization of prohibited
discrimination as "racial animus" suggests that, doctrinally speaking, racial
discrimination under The Act cannot include discrimination based on
normative racial stereotypes.
Second, the Supreme Court has stated that The Civil Rights Act of
1866 prohibits only discrimination on the basis of genetic status in an
ethnic group. As the Court said, The Act prohibits only "discrimination
against an individual because he or she is genetically part of an ethnically...
distinctive sub-grouping of homo sapiens. ' ' 163 Moreover, that discrimina-
tion must occur "solely because of" the plaintiff's status.16 This is very
different from the Court's more expansive language in the sex-
discrimination context, in which the Court noted that "Congress specifi-
cally rejected an amendment that would have placed the word 'solely' in
front of the words 'because of' ,16 into Title VII. Perhaps this broader
standard allowed for the inclusion of normative sex stereotypes.Yet, in the
context of The Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Court has stated that dis-
crimination must occur "solely because of" the plaintiff's status.
Discrimination based on normative stereotypes does not occur solely be-
cause of ethnic status, but, instead, because of something more: failure to
conform to normative stereotypes associated with genetic ethnic status.
Lastly, the Supreme Court has repeatedly reinforced the doctrine
that The Civil Rights Act of 1866 only reaches racial discrimination per-
161. Cf ROBERT C. POST ET AL., PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW, 1 (Robert C. Post, ed., Duke University Press 2001) (2000)
(suggesting that much of American antidiscrimination law is doctrinally muddled but
nonetheless posses a logic).
162. Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617 (1987).
163. Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 613 (emphasis added).
164. Id. (emphasis added).
165. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241, n.7.
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petrated against a member of a different ethnic group. 166 As we have seen,
the expansion of The Act to normative racial stereotypes brings with it a
corresponding leniency in this regard. In the New York Hasidic zoning
cases, many of the defendants were themselves Jewish, and it is reasonable
to expect that normative stereotypes will often be invoked between
members of the same group. Thus, this trend contradicts established Civil
Rights Act jurisprudence.
This trend may be within the logic of The Act, nonetheless. First,
such discrimination on the basis of normative stereotypes really is dis-
crimination on the basis of race. Another concept from gender
discrimination law, that of "sex plus" discrimination, is useful in illustrat-
ing this logic. Unlawful "sex plus discrimination" occurs when animus is
directed not towards sex per se, but to some other feature that is deemed
unacceptable solely because of sex. 167 For example, where an employer
will hire men with young children but not women with young children,
the employer has engaged in unlawful sex discrimination. 6 8 As the Court
said, this amounts to having "one hiring policy for women and another
for men-each having pre-school-age children.' 69  In the case of
LeBlanc-Sternberg, the anti-Hasidic discrimination might be thought of
as 'ethnic status "plus"' discrimination, in which the animus was targeted
at the non-assimilated lifestyle of the Hasidim, the "plus." This plus was
perhaps deemed unacceptable solely because of the ethnic status of the
Hasidic plaintiffs, as an unassimilated lifestyle appears to be acceptable in
non-Jews such as the Amish. This amounts to having one set of expecta-
tions for Jews and another for non-Jews. Thus, when the Hasidim faced
animus based on their status as Hasidim, this might be thought of as ani-
mus that occurred because of race. Where an otherwise neutral category
becomes the basis of discrimination because of the underlying racial cate-
gory, that discrimination could plausibly be said to occur because of
genetic membership in that ethnic group,70 and The Civil Rights Act
prohibits such discrimination.
Second, failure to conform to the requirement that plaintiff and de-
fendant are of different races poses no logical problem. This restriction
may not be a hard and fast doctrinal requirement, but may instead simply
reflect the Supreme Court's functional presumptions as to when racial
discrimination is likely to occur. If racial discrimination should occur
within an ethnic group, as discrimination on the basis of normative
stereotypes often will, there is no reason that The Civil Rights Act should
not reach that discrimination.
166. See Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 609-10.
167. Kirkland, supra note 147, at 83, 102.
168. Phillips v. Martin Marietta, 400 U.S. 542,544 (1971).
169. Id.
170. See id. at 547 (Marshall,J., concurring) ("employment opportunity may be lim-
ited only by employment criteria that are neutral as to the sex of the applicant.").
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Even if such a trend is emerging, and even if it conforms to the
logic of The Act, it is deeply troubling that the courts in question claimed
to be merely operating within the bounds of Civil Rights Act jurispru-
dence. They certainly were not. Instead, they reached these noteworthy
and perhaps revolutionary results by ignoring and mangling established
doctrine. The expansion of the statutes beyond all previous interpretations
to recognize a new type of racial discrimination has significant implica-
tions for the meaning of race and racial stereotypes. Unfortunately, these
courts never acknowledged that they were undertaking such an endeavor,
and were likely not prepared to deal with the consequences. Sloppy and
injudicious decision-making is not the way to deal with questions that
have such an important impact on our society. Instead, expansion of civil
rights laws should occur through open and forthright debate about the
171social meaning of race and racial stereotypes.
Towards that end, there are two significant challenges that courts
will have to grapple with as they seek to apply The Civil Rights Act of
1866 to cases of discrimination based on normative racial stereotypes.
First, what will qualify as a prohibited normative racial stereotype? Will
any person's subjective beliefs about ethnic norms count, or will the
courts require objective, widely-held, beliefs? Appiah's definition of nor-
mative stereotypes, that they are "grounded in social consensus
' 172
suggests an objective standard of widely-held beliefs, as do examples of
normative sex stereotyping in violation of Title VII. 173 There is also reason
to believe that The Civil Rights Act, specifically, would only recognize
objective normative beliefs: Shaare Tefila Congregation and St. Francis College
very much promote objective definitions, such as the requirement that a
plaintiff must be a member of one of the objectively determined ethnic
174
groups.
Furthermore, the Kratz case could be read as a rejection of the
proposition that subjective normative stereotypes constitute prohibited
discrimination. Kratz alleged that he was not promoted because he was
not Jewishly observant, while observant Jews were favored. In other
words, Kratz alleged that he was discriminated against based on his failure
to conform to the college's beliefs about how Jews should behave, namely,
that they should be observant ofJewish religion.Yet the court did not find
171. Cf PosT, supra note 161, at 1 (calling for such a frank and open discussion about
the social meaning of race and gender, instead of the usual muddled court opinion that
invents loopholes and twists doctrine so as to avoid the big issue: what features of society
and individuality should anti-discrimination law protect?).
172. Appiah, supra note 27, at 64.
173. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 235-56 (holding employer's statements encourag-
ing the plaintiff to wear make-up, swear less, and "walk more femininely," constituted
prohibited sex stereotyping).
174. Shaare Tefila Congregation, 481 U.S. at 617-18; Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 613.
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that this claim was actionable under The Civil Rights Act.1 75 This might
be explained by noting that, unlike assimilation, demands for greater Jew-
ish religious observance have not been widespread in American society.
This rejection of Kratz's claim suggests that The Civil Rights Act will not
be extended to subjective normative discrimination, but only to a certain
objective set of normative racial stereotypes. But is this right? Is a subjec-
tive normative stereotype, such as the one that burdened Kratz, any less
objectionable? In the future, courts must weigh these doctrinal hints
against a normative view of anti-discrimination law.
Second, as demonstrated above, a norm that is not specifically associ-
ated with membership in a racial or ethnic group is different from a
normative racial stereotype. Enforcement of generally applicable norma-
tive beliefs simply cannot be considered racial discrimination. This Note
suggests that the Hasidim faced discrimination on the basis of normative
racial stereotypes, because they were subjected to pressures to assimilate
that perhaps would not have been brought to bear on the Amish. This
difference implies that assimilation could be viewed as a norm specifically
associated with Jewish ethnic status, and not as a general social norm. But
it is not clear how many points of comparison should be required to es-
tablish that a norm is associated with an ethnic group. If there is empirical
evidence that a norm applies to a certain racial group, is it sufficient to
show merely that there exists some other racial group to whom this norm
does not apply? Such a difference would show that the norm is not uni-
versal, and would suggest that its application to a plaintiff was based, to
some extent, on the plaintiff's ethnic status. Or would it be necessary to
show that no other ethnic group has this norm? This would allow a de-
termination that the invocation of a given norm was uniquely associated
with the plaintiff's membership in a racial group.116 This would certainly
constitute action "on the basis of race," as there is no chance that the
plaintiff would have been expected to conform to this norm, but for his
or her race.
In the gender context, these judgments are less difficult. The law
analyzes gender discrimination claims in a binary sense,' 77 and so there is
only one control group to examine in discerning gender-specific norms.
Furthermore, gender stereotypes are often better defined than those for
different ethnicities, as the Supreme Court has noted:
It takes no special training to discern sex stereotyping in a de-
scription of an aggressive female employee as requiring "a
175. Kratz v. Coll. Of Staten Island, No. 96-CV-0680, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5199 at
*7-*8 (E.D.N.Y Mar. 15, 2000).
176. Cf Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240-41 (discussing the difference between "be-
cause of" and "solely because of" causation).
177. See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573-75 (6th Cir. 2004); see also gener-
ally Kirkland, supra note 147.
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course at charm school," nor does it require expertise in psy-
chology to know that, if an employee's flawed "interpersonal
skills" can be corrected by a soft-hued suit or a new shade of
lipstick, perhaps it is the employee's sex and not her interper-
sonal skills that has drawn the criticism.
17 8
If women are burdened, one only must look to see the impact on
men. With ethnicity, on the other hand, one could imagine looking to
many different ethnic groups to determine whether a norm is specifically
attached to a single group. For example, to ascertain the racial norms im-
plicit in pressures on Jews to assimilate, one might look not only at the
Amish, but also to other groups such as Indians, Africans, Latin Americans,
and Arabs. For a Jewish plaintiff to make out a claim of discrimination on
the basis of normative stereotypes would the plaintiff really be required to
show that each of these other ethnic groups was not similarly subjected to
pressures to assimilate? This would be a very difficult proposition, as as-
similation has been a fact of life for many immigrant groups in America.
Or could the plaintiff merely look to a single control group, such as the
Amish, and-on the basis of the difference between the pressures on Jews
and on this apparently similar group of non-Jews-assert that there is at
least some racial component to the assimilation norm?
A new doctrine that prohibits discrimination on the basis of norma-
tive racial stereotypes under The Civil Rights Act of 1866 may be
emerging. It has thus far been seen in judicial opinions that departed drasti-
cally from doctrinal restraints and yet did not acknowledge their own
innovations, nor offer cogent and compelling explanations for them. As this
trend is applied and tested, courts must openly address its implications.
What sorts of beliefs will count, how will racial content be discerned, and
how does this change the way we think about racial discrimination? We
need inquire further.
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178. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 256.
179. See Leblanc-Sternberg, 781 F. Supp. at 268.
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